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THE CONTROVERSY OVER SYSTEMIC RISK 
REGULATION 
Roberta S. Karmel* 
INTRODUCTION 
here is widespread support for a systemic risk regulator in the 
United States and in Europe. There is, however, less agreement on 
which existing or new organization(s) should assume the task of regulat-
ing against systemic risk, on the authority such a regulator should have, 
or on the work such a regulator should undertake. In general, the debate 
about enhanced systemic risk regulation has been about whether central 
banks or other regulators should be required to assess systemic risk or 
whether such an assessment should be the job of others. The debate in-
cludes the issue of whether a systemic risk regulator should also be a 
prudential regulator and whether the regulator that assesses systemic risk 
should also have the authority to mandate changes in the financial mar-
kets or changes to financial institutions when dangers to the markets 
emerge. Much of this debate has been in the form of turf warfare be-
tween central banks and other regulators, and therefore the discussions 
have been less enlightened than one would have hoped for given the 
magnitude of the problems uncovered during the financial meltdown of 
2008. 
In the United States, the primary issue regarding a systemic risk regu-
lator is whether the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) should become the 
systemic risk regulator or whether such new powers conflict with the 
Fed’s role with respect to monetary policy or with the Fed’s prudential 
regulation of individual bank holding companies.1 As an alternative or as 
an addition to making the Fed a systemic risk regulator, a Council of 
Regulators has been proposed as a replacement for the President’s Work-
ing Group.2 Similarly, in Europe there has been a debate over whether 
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 1. Regulatory Restructuring: Balancing the Independence of the Federal Reserve in 
Monetary Policy with Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Do-
mestic Monetary Policy and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (statement of John B. Taylor, Professor of Economics and Senior Fellow of 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University). 
 2. After the stock market crash of 1987, the President appointed a Working Group 
on Financial Markets comprised of the Secretary of Treasury, and the Chairmen of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 
T
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the European Central Bank (“ECB”), national central banks, or other 
regulators should be given systemic risk regulatory responsibilities.3 One 
of the problems with deciding on an appropriate risk regulator is that sys-
temic risk can emerge from various corners of the financial system. It 
can be generated by financial firms or products beyond the purview of a 
central bank’s expertise or its usual jurisdiction. Further, in the eyes of 
many critics, the Fed did a poor job of predicting or preventing the 2008 
financial meltdown.4 Moreover, in the United Kingdom, where the Fi-
nancial Services Authority (“FSA”), rather than the Bank of England, 
was responsible for the regulation of financial firms, the FSA was equal-
ly inept. 
This author believes that any systemic risk regulator should be an in-
dependent agency without responsibilities that would conflict with its 
duties to examine and make recommendations with regard to systemic 
risks. Further, important systemic risks will necessarily remain within the 
purview of existing regulators unless the United States moves to a model 
of regulation by many fewer agencies, a politically unlikely develop-
ment. Some of these regulators currently are independent agencies, but 
some are not. Also, although the Council of Regulators contemplated by 
many of the pending reform proposals would be an improvement over 
the President’s Working Group, a committee of agency heads is unlikely 
to effectively blow the whistle on dangerous products or activities in the 
financial markets. Further, one or more agencies need to have the power 
to enforce any decision that a serious systemic risk exists. To suppose 
that some super-regulator or the Fed will have the sole power to enforce 
recommendations with regard to risky products or conduct in the finan-
cial markets, in our politically fractured and captured world is, in the au-
thor’s opinion, unrealistic. 
Accordingly, the author recommends the creation of a new agency. 
This new agency could be modeled on the Office of Management and 
Budget (“OMB”), the Government Accounting Office (“GAO”), or the 
National Transportation Safety Board, but independent of the Executive 
and Congressional Branches. It could investigate and analyze systemic 
risks and propose action to the President, Congress, or individual regula-
                                                                                                             
and the Fed to agree on intermarket mechanisms to prevent another crash. Exec. Order 
No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988). 
 3. José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, 
Presentation of the Report “Observatorio sobre la reforma de los mercados financieros 
2009, realizado por la Fundación de Estudios Financieros,” (Jan. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100122.en.html. 
 4. Robert Weissman, Deregulation and the Financial Crisis¸ HUFFINGTON POST, 
Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-weissman/deregulation-and-the-
fina_b_82639.html. 
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tory agencies, including the Fed. This systemic risk regulator should con-
sult with the Council of Regulators, but implementation of any recom-
mendations should be left to the responsible agencies, to the Executive, 
or to Congress. One of the problems with a more radical regulatory 
reform, that may well be in order, is that blame for the financial melt-
down has been a political hot potato and many officials who were re-
sponsible have not yet accepted responsibility. Given the complex struc-
ture of the European Union (“EU”), it would seem that a systemic risk 
regulator for Europe would similarly have to be an advisory body within 
the framework of the E.U. The E.U. Commission has proposed such a 
regulator.5 
Part I will define systemic risk and the various proposals for a systemic 
risk regulator that have been put forth in the United States. Part II will 
discuss the conflicts of interest between assessing systemic risk and act-
ing as a prudential regulator. Part III will outline the consideration of 
similar issues in Europe. Part IV will delineate a proposal for a new sys-
temic risk regulator. 
I. PROPOSALS FOR A SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATOR 
A. Defining Systemic Risk 
There are various types of risk in the capital markets, both to individu-
al firms and to the system as a whole.6 A financial product can pose 
counterparty credit risk, operational risk, and market risk.7 Undue con-
centrations, excessive leverage, or internal control failures can cause a 
financial firm to collapse. Systemic risk is risk to an entire financial sys-
tem or market, as opposed to the collapse of one firm within that market.8 
This risk comes about because firms price only internal costs and bene-
fits and not risks to the financial system.9 Therefore, individual firms find 
it profitable to take on more risk and leverage than is socially optimal.10 
Furthermore, the financial meltdown of 2008 demonstrated that financial 
contagion spread from the United States to other countries because there 
                                                                                                             
 5. Commission Communication for the Spring European Council, Driving European 
Recovery, COM (2009) 114 final (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ 
commission_2004-2009/president/pdf/press_20090304_en.pdf. 
 6. Christine M. Cumming & Beverly J. Hirtle, The Challenges of Risk Management 
in Diversified Financial Companies, 3 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION  89, 89 (2001). 
 7. Kathleen A. Scott, Addressing the Conditions Leading to System Risk on a Global 
Basis, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2009, at 2. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. Matthew Beville, Comment, Financial Pollution: Systemic Risk and Market Sta-
bility, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 245 (2009). 
 10. Id. at 246. 
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was no international architecture to prevent global crises from erupting.11 
National financial systems, like individual financial firms may thus be-
come over-leveraged and take risks that will then infect the global mar-
kets. 
The current financial crisis was sparked by unregulated or poorly regu-
lated securitization of mortgages and credit default swaps.12 Additional 
related causes, such as failures by credit rating agencies (“CRA”s) to 
appropriately price rated securities, also were important. Systemic risk 
can also arise from poorly regulated financial institutions or speculative 
market conduct. Some of the tools currently in place to guard against the 
collapse of individual firms, such as capital adequacy rules by banking 
and securities regulators, did not ward off the collapse of individual firms 
that were important to the financial system. In fact, over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) derivatives markets were not regulated at all. This paper will 
address the issue of whether the current proposals for a systemic risk 
regulator are likely to prevent systemic shocks to the financial markets in 
the future. 
B. The Administration’s Proposals and Counter-proposals 
In March 2009, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury outlined a frame-
work for regulatory reform, initially focusing on containing systemic 
risk.13 This framework was important for what it covered, and also for 
the issues that it did not address. There were five components of the 
Treasury’s framework: 1) a single independent systemic regulator with 
responsibility for systemically important firms, critical payment and set-
tlement systems; 2) higher capital and risk management standards for 
systemically important firms; 3) registration of all hedge fund advisers of 
a certain size with the SEC; 4) a comprehensive framework of oversight, 
protections and disclosure for the OTC derivatives market; and 5) new 
requirements for money market funds to reduce the risk of rapid with-
drawals.14 
An alternative proposal for a Council of Regulators was put forth by 
some Republicans and advocated by the Chairman of the Federal Deposit 
                                                                                                             
 11. DICK K. NANTO, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 23 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RL34742.pdf. 
 12. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Sys-
temic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 
41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2009). 
 13. See Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulato-
ry Reform (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg72.html. 
 14. Id. 
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Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). This Council would address issues that 
pose risks to the financial system as a whole and would include a Chair-
man of the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Fed, 
the Chairman of the FDIC, the Chairman of the National Credit Union 
Administration, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”) and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”).15 The Chairman of the Council of Regulators 
would serve as the principal advisor to the President on matters related to 
overseeing, monitoring, and preventing systemic risk and would make 
recommendations to the Council on systemic risk regulatory policy.16 
This proposal would centralize the responsibility for supervising system-
ically important financial institutions and would identify and mitigate the 
build-up of risk by individual firms. The Council would identify system-
ically important institutions, practices and markets, implement actions to 
address those risks, ensure information flow, analyze and make recom-
mendations on potential systemic risks, set capital adequacy standards, 
and ensure that key regulators apply those standards. The Council would 
have the authority to overrule or force actions on behalf of other regula-
tors.17 
Other Republican proposals would limit the Fed’s authority to oversee-
ing monetary policy and transfer the Fed’s authority for prudential regu-
lation of bank holding companies to a new financial institutions regula-
tor. In addition, the Republicans proposed a Market Stability and Capital 
Adequacy Board to identify systemic risks in the entire financial system. 
This, in addition to the Council members described above, would include 
five private, presidentially-appointed members with no more than three 
members from the same political party.18 Further, one of the eleven 
members would be reserved for someone who had served as a state in-
surance commissioner or supervisor.19 
In June 2009, the Obama Administration issued a White Paper on Fi-
nancial Regulatory Reform,20 followed by legislative texts to implement 
                                                                                                             
 15. Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, S. 664, H.R. 1754, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 16. Id. at § 112(a)(1)(A). 
 17. Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big To Fail”: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (May 6, 
2009) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC) 
 18. Press Release, Committee on Financial Services, Republicans Announce Com-
prehensive Regulatory Reform Plan (June 11, 2009), available at 
http://republicans.financialservices.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=600. 
 19. Id.  
 20. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM A NEW FOUNDATION: 
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the White Paper.21 The Administration’s proposals would require the Fed 
to designate all large, highly leveraged and substantially interconnected 
financial companies as Tier 1 financial holding companies (“FHCs”).22 
This designation would not be limited to bank holding companies, and it 
could extend to foreign financial institutions with sufficient operations in 
the United States.23 The Fed would then regulate FHCs. Such regulation 
would encompass capital adequacy standards, the ordering of corrective 
action, liquidity standards and overall risk management requirements. 
Nevertheless, a working group headed by the Treasury would conduct a 
reassessment of regulatory capital requirements for Tier 1 FHCs and oth-
ers.24 This reassessment would necessarily be in the context of the Basel 
Committee standards for bank capital adequacy. Although the Fed would 
essentially become the primary federal systemic risk regulator, a great 
deal of systemic risk regulation would in fact fall to others because the 
White Paper would leave most of the existing federal financial regulators 
in place.25 
A new Financial Services Oversight Council (“Council”)26 would have 
the Secretary of the Treasury as its Chairman and would have as its 
members the chairs of the federal financial regulatory agencies.27 The 
Council would act essentially as an advisory group responsible for identi-
fying gaps in regulation and detecting emerging risks. It would, however, 
have no power to take direct action or to compel the Fed to do so.28 The 
Council would replace the President’s Working Group. 
                                                                                                             
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 21. See FinancialStability.gov, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed Text of Bank 
Holding Company Modernization Act of 2009, available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleII.pdf . 
 22. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. The Office of Thrift Supervision and the Comptroller of the Currency would be 
folded into a new government agency, the National Bank Supervisor. An Office of Na-
tional Insurance would be created, but it would have no real power other than to enter 
into international agreements and facilitate greater cooperation on insurance regulation by 
the states. A Consumer Financial Protection Agency would be created to protect consum-
ers of financial services, and this agency would take away some powers from the Fed and 
other agencies, but this controversial proposal has little to do with systemic risk regula-
tion. 
 26. See FinancialStability.gov, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed Text of Finan-
cial Services Oversight Council Act of 2009, available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleI.pdf. 
 27. Financial Stability Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3996, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 28. Id.  
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Various tasks related to systemic risk would remain with the SEC, the 
CFTC, or others. Advisers to private pools of capital, including hedge 
funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds would be required 
to register with the SEC if their assets under management exceed some 
specified threshold. Although the funds would not be required to register, 
and the connection between hedge funds in particular and systemic risk 
is more a matter of suspicion than proof, information regarding assets 
under management, leverage, off-balance sheet exposures and other mat-
ters related to systemic risk would have to be reported to the SEC. The 
SEC would then share such reports with the Fed.29 The White Paper also 
assigns to the SEC the task of continuing with plans to strengthen the 
regulatory framework for money market mutual funds and the regulation 
of CRAs, including, wherever possible, the reduction of the use of rat-
ings in regulations.30 
Neither the White Paper, nor the proposed legislation implementing it, 
would merge the SEC and the CFTC or clarify their respective areas of 
jurisdiction with regard to financial futures products. Rather, the SEC 
and the CFTC would be required to harmonize futures and securities 
regulation, and if unable to do so, the Secretary of the Treasury would 
decide any jurisdictional disputes.31 Also, the SEC and the CFTC would 
be given unlimited authority to police market abuses involving over-the-
counter (“OTC”) derivatives.32 
The White Paper requested the SEC and the CFTC to identify conflicts 
in statutes and regulations with respect to similar types of financial in-
struments and explain why such differences are essential to achieve un-
derlying policy objectives or to make recommendations for change.33 
After hearings, these agencies issued such a report on October 16, 
2009.34 Among the topics that specifically relate to systemic risk dis-
cussed in the report were oversight of new products, segregation, insol-
vency, margin regulations, and clearing systems. 
                                                                                                             
 29. On April 29, 2009, the E.U. proposed legislation that would require European 
hedge fund managers with 100 million Euros or more under management to report regu-
larly to their competent national authorities on their main investments, performance and 
risks, and funds would be subject to rules on minimum capital, risk management and 
auditing. 
 30. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20. 
 31. Id.  
 32. See Bill Would Split Oversight Between SEC, CFTC; Goal to ‘Preserve’ Markets, 
41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1397 (July 27, 2009). 
 33. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, supra note 20, at 50–51. 
 34. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION (2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/cftcjointreport101609.pdf. 
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In order to contain systemic risk, the White Paper would require all 
standardized OTC derivatives to be cleared through central counterpar-
ties that impose margin requirements and more stringent capital require-
ments on OTC derivatives dealers.35 Also, standardized derivatives con-
tracts would be required to be transacted on regulated exchanges or elec-
tronic trading platforms.36 These recommendations are strongly endorsed 
by the Fed.37 
An important component of the Administration’s proposal is the crea-
tion of a new financial products consumer protection agency. The White 
Paper proposed that the Council head this agency. The pros and cons of 
creating such an agency will not be discussed in this article. Although it 
can be argued that “the lack of meaningful federal oversight of consumer 
credit exacerbated the off-loading of risk to investors,” sending a shock 
wave across the financial markets.38 In the author’s view, the creation of 
a financial consumer protection agency is unlikely to mitigate systemic 
risk. On the other hand, the Fed’s lax attitude toward consumer credit 
was symptomatic of its deregulatory philosophy. 
Another important component of financial regulatory reform is resolu-
tion authority for large, interconnected financial firms, outside of the 
bankruptcy courts.39 Since the Administration’s proposals were floated, a 
draft law from the Treasury and the House Financial Services Committee 
would give the Fed sweeping powers over systemically significant firms 
short of winding up.40 For example, the Fed could order a firm to sell a 
risky division or stop dangerous trading activity, since the draft bill al-
lows the Fed to require any systemically significant company to “sell or 
                                                                                                             
 35. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 20. 
 36. See Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan, Hedge Funds May Lose as Derivatives Proposal 
Advances, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 12, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=a4bIfOU56Oxo.  
 37. Over-the-Counter Derivative: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Securities, Insur-
ance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (testimony of Patricia White, Assoc. Director, Division of Research and 
Statistics). 
 38. See INVESTORS’ WORKING GROUP, CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY AND 
COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTORS’ 
PERSPECTIVE 18 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource% 
20center/investment%20issues/Investors'%20Working%20Group%20Report%20(July%2
02009).pdf. 
 39. See FinancialStability.gov, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed Resolution Au-
thority for Large, Interconnected Companies Act of 2009, available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-XII_resolution-
authority_072309.pdf. 
 40. See Tom Braithwaite et al., Draft Law Gives Fed Sweeping Powers, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 2009, at 1. 
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otherwise transfer assets or off-balance sheet items to unaffiliated firms, 
to terminate one or more activities or to impose conditions on the manner 
in which the identified financial holding company conducts . . . activi-
ties.”41 
The White Paper’s proposals were controversial, and arguments broke 
out not only between the Administration and members of Congress, but 
also among various federal regulators over the merits of taking powers 
away from the Fed, giving more powers to the Fed, creating a Council of 
Regulators, with or without enforcement powers, and many other mat-
ters. Political realities militate against merging the SEC and the CFTC or 
creating a federal insurance regulator. Considered together with those 
realities, the White Paper’s compromise proposal for moving some au-
thority to or from particular agencies met resistance by the agencies, their 
Congressional oversight committee members, as well as industry lob-
byists.42 
Subsequently, the House passed regulatory reform legislation,43 and 
Senator Dodd proposed a companion Senate bill.44 The House bill 
tracked the White Paper’s proposals in most important respects. It would 
create a Council of regulators to oversee systemic risk and prepare strat-
egies for threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system.45 Primary 
financial regulatory agencies would be empowered to enforce prudential 
standards. The Fed would have the power to treat systemically important 
non-bank financial holding companies as if they were bank holding com-
panies.46 OTC derivatives would be forced into clearinghouses and on to 
exchanges. An independent financial products consumer protection 
agency would be created. A new resolution authority would be created 
for bank holding companies or any systemically important financial 
company whereby the FDIC would act as receiver according to bank res-
olution rules rather than bankruptcy rules. 
The Senate bill also would assign systemic risk assessment functions 
to a Council, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, but it would in 
addition create an Office of Financial Research within the Department of 
the Treasury to act as an advisor to the Council.  This Office would col-
lect and analyze financial data.47 Two important differences between the 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 44. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 45. H.R. 4173. 
 46. Id. 
 47. S. 3217. 
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House and Senate bills relating to systemic risk concern resolution au-
thority and the financial consumer protection agency.  The Senate bill 
would set up an Orderly Liquidation Authority Panel composed of three 
judges from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that 
could appoint the FDIC as a receiver.  The Senate bill also would place 
the financial consumer protection agency inside the Fed as an indepen-
dent agency.  
In view of the partisanship on display in Washington, it is difficult to 
predict whether there will be any meaningful regulatory reform during 
this session of Congress. Further, both the House and Senate bills would 
result in only incremental changes in the structure and powers of finan-
cial regulators.  Nevertheless, it can be expected that existing regulators 
will exercise their powers to increase capital adequacy requirements, 
mandate risk management systems and otherwise guard against systemic 
risk more forcefully. 
C. Conflicts between Systemic and Prudential Regulation 
There are several reasons why proposals that give the Fed the respon-
sibility for being the systemic risk regulator have generated opposition. 
Many observers feel the Fed was a systemic risk regulator and it failed to 
prevent the speculative boom in structured finance products that led to 
the financial meltdown. They charge that the Fed’s easy money policy 
enabled financial firms to amass large concentrations of risky and com-
plex securitized products.48 Alan Greenspan, as Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, embraced derivatives since he believed they were good 
for banks because they spread risk.49 He argued that derivatives were 
essential to the stability of the banking system and therefore should not 
be regulated.50 Further, he “attributed the substantial increase in U.S. 
wealth and productivity in part to the derivatives markets.”51 However, 
by keeping interest rates too low, the Fed fueled a stock market bubble 
and then a credit bubble.52 
                                                                                                             
 48. Braithwaite et. al., supra note 40, at 25.  
 49. David Blake, Greenspan’s sins return to haunt us, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at 
17. 
 50. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Deriva-
tives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1023–24 (2007). 
 51. Kai Kramer, Comment, Aren’t We Still in the “Garden of the Forking Paths”? A 
Comment on Consolidation of the SEC and CFTC, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 410, 417 
(2004). 
 52. See Greg Ip, In Treating U.S. After Bubble, Fed Helped Create New Threats, 
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2005, at A1. 
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Other critics believe that the Fed has too much power now and should 
not get more power without greater congressional oversight.53 More than 
250 Republicans co-sponsored a bill that would allow the GAO to con-
duct audits of Fed decisions on monetary policy.54 Members of this 
group argued that the Fed’s role should be limited to overseeing mone-
tary policy and the payments system, and regulatory responsibilities and 
systemic oversight detract from focus on fighting inflation.55 
Others have focused on the conflicts of interest inherent in having a 
prudential regulator of financial holding companies also act as a systemic 
regulator. As the prudential regulator of bank holding companies and 
Tier 1 FHCs, would the Fed have the backbone to put an end to the sale 
of financial products or to financial businesses that are lucrative for the 
banks? Alan Greenspan not only did not do so, but encouraged the ex-
pansion of derivatives trading because it seemed to enhance the balance 
sheets of banks.56 It has been argued that the capital rules of the Basel II 
accords, endorsed by the world’s leading central banks increased market 
instability during the financial crisis.57 While a different Fed Chairman, 
less enamored of deregulation than Alan Greenspan, might take a differ-
ent approach to financial products that increase the earnings of banks, the 
conflict between systemic regulation, prudential regulation and monetary 
policy are difficult to reconcile. These conflicts have become worse since 
the bailout because Wall Street banks are buying massive amounts of 
securities to help stabilize the markets.58 Some advocates of giving the 
Fed enhanced powers and responsibilities as a systemic regulator have 
therefore argued that prudential regulation of banks should be transferred 
to a consolidated federal bank regulator.59 One additional reason given 
for not making the Fed the systemic regulator is that the Fed favors 
                                                                                                             
 53. Edmund L. Andrews, Two Authorities on Fed Advise Congress Against Expand-
ing Its Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at B3. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jon Hilsenrath, Revamp Could Hurt Central Bank, Warns Head of Philadelphia 
Fed, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2009, at A6; John Taylor, Fed Needs Better Performance, Not 
Powers, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at 7. 
 56. Blake, supra note 49. 
 57. Beville, supra note 9, at 249. All of the largest investment banks including Bear 
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan were using Basel II net capital calculations. 
 58. Brooke Masters & Henny Sender, Wall St Profits from Fed Role, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2009, at 1. 
 59. Reducing Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Insti-
tution); Alan Blinder, Early Warnings System, Run by the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
2009, at BU5; Robert C. Pozen, Systemic Risk and the Fed, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2009, at 
A13; Mark Warner, America Needs A Single Bank Regulator, FIN. TIMES., Aug. 6, 2009, 
at 11. 
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secrecy over public disclosure and would not be sufficiently transpa-
rent.60 
The Administration’s proposals set off a turf war. Some agencies, to-
gether with their congressional oversight committees, are afraid of losing 
power; thus, various arguments have been raised in favor of the status 
quo.61 These arguments are generally in the form of advocating that a 
Council of Regulators should become the systemic risk regulator.62 Yet, 
the President’s Working Group has been in existence since 1987 and it 
has been largely ineffectual in identifying products or practices that pose 
risks to the financial system.63 A committee of regulators frequently en-
gaged in turf warfare is unlikely to solve system wide risks to the finan-
cial markets. 
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) 
has recommended that all important financial institutions and systems 
should be subject to a systemic risk regulator, regardless of their charter 
or primary functional regulator.64 The systemic risk regulator should 
have access to information about any institution that might be systemi-
cally important, as it determines. Further, market sectors where individu-
al firms are not systemically important, but where such firms in the ag-
gregate may have a significant impact on systemic risk, should be in-
cluded within the purview of a systemic risk regulator.65 According to 
SIFMA, systemically important institutions are those likely to have “se-
rious adverse effects on economic conditions or the financial stability of 
other entities if they were allowed to fail.”66 Although SIFMA endorsed 
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a single oversight body as a systemic risk regulator, it was neutral as to 
whether the Fed should be that body.67 
Most commentators share the opinion that the Fed should remain inde-
pendent and any systemic risk regulator should be independent.68 The 
meaning of independence in this context is generally left undefined, 
however. Does it mean independent from the Executive and/or Congres-
sional branches of government, or does it mean independent from regu-
lated entities? Such entities generally exert their influence through the 
congressional oversight committees for the financial regulators, and giv-
en the corrupting influence of campaign contributions on U.S. politics, 
such influence is difficult to resist. Although a stable source of funding is 
sometimes considered a way for a financial regulator to remain indepen-
dent, some argue that such funding necessarily leads to the agency’s loss 
of independence if it comes from regulated entities. As an example, the 
Fed has been criticized for the heavy influence that banks have on its 
governance.69 
II. THE EUROPEAN DEBATE 
The E.U. Commission issued a Communication in May 2009 recom-
mending that the European Council:  
1) endorse the creation of a new European Systemic Risk Council 
(“ESRC”) chaired by the President of the ECB and composed of gover-
nors of national central banks, the chairpersons of the three European 
Supervisory Authorities and a member of the Commission . . . [and] 
. . . . 
2) agree on the establishment of a new European System of Financial 
Supervisors (“ESFS”) composed of three new European Supervisory 
Authorities to develop common supervisory approaches and a single set 
of harmonized rules for all financial firms . . . .
70
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The role of the ESRC would be to collect and analyze information in or-
der to monitor and assess potential threats arising from macro-economic 
developments and developments within the financial system as a 
whole.71 The ESRC would identify and prioritize systemic risks and then 
issue warnings, to make recommendations and to monitor the agencies 
responsible for taking remedial action.72 The ESRC would not have le-
gally binding powers, and would be accountable to the Council and Eu-
ropean Parliament.73 In the view of the Commission, Finance Ministers 
should not be members of this systemic risk regulator because such 
membership would blur the ESRC’s role in providing independent tech-
nical analysis of macro-prudential risks.74 
The E.U. currently has three Committees of Supervisors for different 
financial industry segments, which act as advisory committees to coordi-
nate E.U. regulation. These are the Committee of European Banking Su-
pervisors (“CEBS”), Committee of European Insurance and Occupation-
al Pensions Committee (“CEIOPS”) and the Committee of European Se-
curities Regulators (“CESR”). These committees were created pursuant 
to the Lamfalussy process designed to streamline and integrate financial 
regulation.75 The May Communication asserted that these committees 
had reached the limits of what they could accomplish and so they should 
be replaced by three new European Supervisory Authorities, one for 
banking, one for insurance and occupational pensions, and a securities 
authority. These new Supervisory Authorities would then be authorized 
to develop binding technical standards and to draw up interpretive guide-
lines in order to ensure a single set of harmonized rules. It would also 
ensure consistent application of E.U. rules to achieve a common supervi-
sory culture with consistent practices. The Authorities would regulate 
CRAs and counterparty clearing houses, coordinate responses in crisis 
situations, collect micro-prudential information, and undertake an inter-
national role.76 These three Supervisory Authorities would then be com-
bined to form the ESFS.77 The Supervisory Authorities should be de-
signed to be independent and transparent.78 
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The May Communication paid some attention to the legal authority re-
quired to form the ESRC and the ESFS.79 There has long been a debate 
over the question of whether E.U.’s wide regulators for financial services 
could be created without an amendment to the E.U. treaties providing for 
them.80 
The Communication was based on a Report by a Group chaired by 
Jacques de Larosiere,81 followed by a Communication by the Commis-
sion and a comment period.82 The de Larosiere Group Report argued that 
while it supports an enlarged role for the ECB in macro-prudential over-
sight, it did not support any role for the ECB in micro-prudential over-
sight. Some of its reasons were rooted in the special problems of E.U. 
law and politics, while others resonated with the debates in the United 
States. The Group argued that adding micro-supervisory duties to the 
ECB’s brief could impinge on its fundamental mandate of monetary sta-
bility.83 Also, the ECB is not entitled to deal with insurance companies.84 
The United Kingdom has frequently parted company with other E.U. 
countries with regard to financial regulation, so it is interesting that the 
U.K. has been supportive of the Commission’s Communication, and in 
particular endorsed the idea of establishing the ESFS and the ESRB.85 
Within the U.K., the Treasury has argued for maintaining the existing 
regulatory structure where the Financial Services Authority is a unified 
regulator for all financial services, and the Bank of England is responsi-
ble for financial stability.86 
Both the U.S. and the E.U. need to consider how to incorporate into 
domestic law the recommendations and decisions of the Financial Stabil-
ity Board, which was created and enlarged by the G-20 to supersede the 
Financial Stability Forum. The mandate of the Financial Stability Board 
is “to address vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regu-
latory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stabili-
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ty.”87 It has focused on critical reforms underway in a number of areas, 
including reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important 
financial firms and expanding oversight of the financial system.88 
III. THE CREATION OF A NEW SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATOR  
The specifications for a systemic risk regulator in the United States 
would not be so difficult or so controversial if the regulatory system for 
financial institutions was not already so balkanized. Almost every study 
of the U.S. financial regulatory system has recommended consolidation 
of the plethora of agencies regulating financial institutions and prod-
ucts.89 Although there have been different proposals for two peaks, three 
peaks or more peaks regulation, none of the studies recommend that the 
present system should remain in place. The Administration’s proposals in 
this regard are exceedingly timid. Only the Office of Thrift Supervision 
would be abolished; the SEC and the CFTC would remain separate agen-
cies; and insurance supervision would remain with fifty state regula-
tors.90 The Senate bill would further consolidate the banking agencies, 
however.  The idea that the Fed should take on the responsibility of de-
signating Tier 1 financial holding companies, act as their systemic regu-
lator, and also continue to supervise bank holding companies as a pru-
dential regulator is a substitute for more far reaching reform of financial 
regulation. Further, it is a poor substitute because it involves too many 
conflicts of interest and it is unlikely to be effective when some of the 
Tier 1 FHCs are regulated by the states and others by a variety of federal 
agencies. If the Fed were to shed its prudential regulatory powers, and a 
consolidated banking agency were to be created, I would be in the camp 
of believing the Fed could function as a systemic regulator. But if such a 
consolidation is not to occur, I believe a new systemic risk regulator 
should be created. Furthermore, if the United States makes the Fed its 
systemic regulator, it will be out of step with the ongoing reforms in the 
E.U., and international coordination may be more difficult as a result. 
Unfortunately, the creation of a new systemic risk regulator would 
merely add to the excessive mix of federal regulators. But if appropriate-
ly structured, it could at least be objective and independent. The Inves-
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tors’ Working Group has proposed an independent systemic risk regula-
tor that would supplement existing financial regulators, and would con-
sist of a chair and four other members, all of whom would be Presidential 
appointees.91 Its mission would include collecting and analyzing the ex-
posures of financial institutions, whether banks or non-banks, as well as 
products and practices that could threaten the stability of the U.S. finan-
cial system and economy. It would undertake reporting on those systemic 
risks and recommending steps by regulators to reduce those risks.92 This 
oversight would require aggregating and analyzing risk exposures across 
firms, securities instruments, and markets.93 The Investors’ Group would 
not give the systemic risk regulator the power to compel financial regula-
tory agencies to adopt regulations or otherwise halt systemic risks. But it 
would make regulators comply with its regulations or provide policy jus-
tifications for not doing so.94 
The Office of Financial Research, proposed in the Senate bill, would 
be a step in the direction of creating a systemic risk monitor.  This Office 
would collect data on behalf of the Council, standardize the types and 
formats of data reported and collected, perform research, and develop 
risk measurement tools.95 It would, however, be a part of the Department 
of the Treasury, an Executive Branch Agency, and therefore it would not 
be an independent agency. Conceivably, it could develop a tradition of 
independence, similar to the culture of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice. 
The author generally agrees with the concept proposed by the Inves-
tors’ Working Group with an important exception. Their proposal con-
templates that the systemic risk regulator would be accountable primarily 
to Congress.96 In my experience, Congress is at least as political as the 
Executive branch,97 and the systemic regulator needs to be independent 
and highly professional.  How an agency can be independent of both 
Congress and the Executive and still be constitutional is a somewhat 
daunting challenge, but such independence in fact, if not in law, should 
be the objective. One way to achieve such independence is to provide the 
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systemic regulator with stable funding sufficient to attract a professional 
staff of experts. But another factor is for the Executive and Congress to 
exercise restraint in interfering with the systemic regulator’s work. It is 
conceivable that the inability of such a regulator to enforce its recom-
mendations may make such restraint possible. 
The GAO is a possible organizational model for a systemic risk regula-
tor. The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that investigates 
how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. Among other 
things, at the request of a congressional committee or subcommittee, it 
audits agency operations, reports on how well government programs and 
policies are meeting their objectives. The GAO also performs policy ana-
lyses and outlines options for congressional consideration.98 The head of 
the GAO, the Comptroller General of the United States, is appointed to a 
15-year term by the President from a slate of candidates, and is subject to 
Senate confirmation.99 This slate is composed of the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the 
majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate, the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.100 Although 
this selection process is cumbersome, it is designed to ensure that the 
Comptroller is independent and nonpartisan. A similar selection process 
for the Chairman of a systemic risk regulator could be appropriate. 
Some lessons could also be taken from the operation of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within OMB. Since OMB 
is a cabinet within the Executive Branch, the head of OMB is not inde-
pendent.101 However, the OIRA within OMB monitors agencies to im-
plement government-wide policies and standards with respect to federal 
regulations and guidance documents. The OIRA also monitors the quali-
ty, utility, and analytic rigor of information used to support public policy, 
particularly with respect to cost/benefit analyses.102 To some extent, 
OIRA is an Executive Branch analogue of OMB with regard to its inte-
raction with Federal agencies. 
Another possible model for a systemic risk agency is the National 
Transportation and Safety Board (“NTSB”), an independent federal 
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agency that investigates every civil aviation accident in the United States 
and accidents in other transportation modes as well.103 It has a board 
composed of five members appointed by the President, with a term of 
five years. No more than three of the five members can be of the Presi-
dent’s party, and the President designates the Chairman and Vice Chair-
man for a term of two years.104 Initially, the NTSB was dependent on 
the Department of Transportation for its funding and administrative sup-
port, but in 1975 all ties to that department were severed.105 Although 
the NTSB has no regulatory authority, its “fiercely independent” identity 
allows it to maintain its credibility in investigating accidents, providing 
“careful and conclusive forensic analysis,” and making recommendations 
to avoid future accidents.106 Although neither GAO, OMB, nor the 
NTSB have the power to compel agencies to act or refrain from acting, 
they nevertheless are powerful actors within the Federal government and 
influence rulemaking and other policies. My vision of an appropriate sys-
temic regulator is a similar type of agency—responsive both to Congress 
and the Executive—that could investigate and analyze financial data to 
determine whether systemic risks are emerging. This systemic regulator 
should have the power to advise financial regulators of dangers, and sug-
gest mitigating actions, perhaps by forwarding its reports to the Council 
of Regulators. However, it would be the duty of the financial regulators, 
Congress and the Executive Branch to deal with implementing action. In 
the final analysis, the problem of dealing with systemic risk is a political 
problem. A systemic risk regulator cannot, and should not, bear all of the 
responsibility for preventing financial market meltdowns. But a good 
regulator could uncover dangers to the financial system and assign re-
sponsibility for preventing collapses to those charged with regulating 
financial institutions and markets. Although the Office of Financial Re-
search that would be established by the Senate bill is a step in the direc-
tion, its independence and mission would have to be better articulated for 
it to function effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
The causes of the financial meltdown and ongoing recession are com-
plex. At their root the causes are economic, such as government budget 
deficits and trade imbalances. But poor regulation made this crisis much 
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worse.107 Fixing the U.S. and E.U. regulatory systems is exceedingly 
difficult. But because there are genuine differences of opinion about 
what solutions are optimal, even if all of the experts were to agree on the 
needed reforms, politics stand in the way of a genuine reform. As critics 
of the de Larosiere Report remarked: “If even a group of experts cannot 
muster the courage to lay out imaginative blueprints, one can hardly ex-
pect politicians who have failed thus far to rise to the occasion and face 
head-on Europe’s current challenges, to go beyond the timidity of the 
Report they commissioned.”108 Similar criticism can be leveled against 
the Obama Administration’s proposals. Bowing to perceived political 
realities, the Treasury’s program does very little to address the balka-
nized regulatory system, where financial firms can choose their regula-
tors and compromise the agencies charged with their supervision. Mean-
while, the regulators do not have the funds, the staff, or the technology to 
keep pace with what is happening in the markets, and they are hobbled 
rather than emboldened by their Congressional oversight committees.109  
If some firms are too big or too interconnected to fail, they should be 
dismantled.110 This does not necessarily mean going back to the wall be-
tween investment and commercial banking, but it may require such 
measures. When the SEC was initially formed it was tasked with break-
ing up the public utility holding companies that contributed to the spe-
culative stock market of the 1920s.111 The U.S. taxpayer should never 
again be asked to bailout Wall Street, but the proposed reforms do not 
prevent such a reoccurrence. The purpose of credit and securities markets 
is to finance business, not to generate trading profits. But all of the regu-
latory agencies over the past quarter of a century have inevitably encour-
aged trading and speculation over capital formation and have emphasized 
efficiency over fairness.112 
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The proposed reforms may lead to minor improvements in financial 
regulation, but they are unlikely to prevent another speculative securities 
market and its inevitable collapse. They are also unlikely to restore the 
confidence of investors in the fairness or safety of the markets. At one 
time, stock market panics affected only a few. But today, most Ameri-
cans and many Europeans invest their retirement savings in the stock 
market.113 Market collapses therefore lead to widespread pain. The pub-
lic deserves better reform than the politicians are offering. 
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